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INTRODUCTION
This note will start where many other papers analyzing private military 
contractors (PMCs) start, with a description of the general problems 
associated with the use of contractors. The use of PMC personnel in such 
mission critical situations as security operations is no doubt a complex 
issue. However, the consensus seems to be that there is too little 
accountability stemming from a lack of oversight and that some fairly 
substantial changes will be required to correct the situation. This note 
proposes the adoption of a U.S. Foreign Legion as one possible solution to 
the overreliance on PMC personnel in Afghanistan. 
The solution proposed in this paper is in no way intended to be an 
immediate resolution to all issues associated with the use of PMCs. Those 
who have analyzed the overreliance on PMCs seem resigned to the fact that 
no one, short-term solution is available.2 The proposed solution in this note 
is offered only as one part of a solution to the complex issue that 
overreliance on private security contractors presents. This note specifically 
examines the implementation of a formalized, structured, U.S. Foreign 
Legion, which would build on current U.S. laws, borrow from other 
formalized foreign military institutions, and would reduce some of the 
problems currently associated with reliance on PMC personnel by 
incorporating these same individuals into the existing U.S. military 
command structure. 
 2. COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & AFG. INTERIM REPORT NO. 2, AT
WHAT RISK?: CORRECTING OVER-RELIANCE ON CONTRACTORS IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
9 (2011) [hereinafter CWC, AT WHAT RISK?] (“Reducing this over-reliance will take resolve, 
zealous attention, resource investments, and time.”). 
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I. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT U.S. RELIANCE ON PRIVATE MILITARY 
CONTRACTORS
A. Overreliance on Private Contractors Generally 
“Though some organic capability still exists, agencies cannot 
successfully self-perform for the length of time and with the breadth of 
responsibility required in Iraq and Afghanistan.”3 What was initially a quick 
fix use of contractors for an immediate need in mission critical situations 
where tight deadlines necessitated immediate action has now become a 
more or less permanently “default option.”4 The bottom line is that if the 
military needs a job done and cannot handle it with its own personnel, the 
job gets contracted out.5
PMCs are supposed to help “[r]educe the need to hire and train new 
federal civilian employees[, and] [p]rovide flexibility in expanding and 
reducing support personnel quickly and as needed.”6 Essentially, PMC 
personnel are at-will employees who can be hired on or laid off as the 
situation dictates. Assuming that this flexibility actually leads to cost 
savings—something that will be analyzed later—this system comes with 
some substantial drawbacks for mission-critical functions. Namely, PMC 
personnel are also free to walk away from a mission any time they want.7
As Peter Singer succinctly puts it, a contractor can simply say to himself: 
I’m not being “paid enough for this #%&.”8 These private entities may 
abandon a specific mission or task and there is no way that the U.S. military 
can force them to stay.9 Contract employees simply do not face the same 
sanctions for defecting from service that regular soldiers do.10
“The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have seen unprecedented reliance on 
contractors to support American operations and objectives.”11 Truly, 
“relying on contractors has become the ‘default option’ for many functions, 
including security for convoys and persons, even if it may not be a 
legitimate or preferable option.”12 Despite the fact that it may not even be a 
legitimate option, U.S. dependence on and use of PMCs persists and the 
 3. Id. at 13. 
 4. Id. at 14. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 8. 
 7. P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY 
INDUSTRY 160-61 (2008). 
 8. Id. at 162. 
 9. Id. at 160-61 (citing Stephen Zamparrelli, Contractors on the Battlefield: What 
Have We Signed Up For?, AIR FORCE J. LOGISTICS, 19 (1999)). 
 10. Id. at 160. 
 11. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 6. 
 12. Id. at 10. 
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conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are now “the most contractor-dependent 
armed conflict in U.S. history.”13
How did the United States get to this point? Some have suggested that 
the “combination of reduced government staffing and increased government 
responsibility” may have essentially “opened a breach into which 
contractors have stepped,”14 by the hundreds of thousands it would seem. 
The increased government responsibility comes from the obvious strain 
of fighting two simultaneous wars lasting nearly a decade each. The lack of 
government staffing can potentially be explained, over the long term at 
least, by the fact that the United States currently relies on an all-volunteer 
army and has since Richard Nixon’s 1973 announcement of a shift away 
from conscription in response to opposition to the draft during Vietnam.15
This paper in no way advocates for conscription. Even if that were the most 
logical solution to filling the thousands of spots that would be left by 
contractors, it would likely be political suicide for any politician to suggest 
it, let alone act on it. 
However, there is something unsettling about the fact that “[c]ontractor 
employees—U.S. citizens and foreign nationals—at their peak represented 
nearly half of the total force deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.”16 In 2010, 
this meant that nearly 200,000 contractors, 199,78317 to be more precise 
than the data may actually allow, “were supporting U.S. and allied 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.”18 Department of Defense (DoD) reports 
place the estimate of the number of U.S. military personnel in Iraq and 
Afghanistan at the same time to be 202,100.19
As the numbers above suggest, there is some uncertainty in calculating 
exactly how many contractor personnel are currently at work in theater, but 
a round number of 200,000 is useful for understanding the scope of 
contractor reliance. This 200,000 figure is also useful for getting a sense of 
the level of reliance on non-citizen foreign contractor personnel when one 
considers that over 150,000 of these contractors are either Iraqi nationals, 
Afghan nationals, or third-country nationals, with another 1,209 individuals 
of unknown or apparently undeterminable nationality.20 Simple math tells us 
that, conservatively, this means that over 75% of our military force now 
consists of non-citizen foreign nationals. 
This note in no way suggests that the United States should immediately 
abandon reliance on all 200,000 contract personnel, or even that it abandon 
 13. Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Contractors and the Ultimate Sacrifice,
SERV. CONTRACTOR, Sept. 2010, at 16, 18.  
 14. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 13. 
 15. CYNTHIA A. WATSON, U.S. MILITARY SERVICE 125 (2007). 
 16. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 24. 
 17. Id. at 7 (citations omitted). 
 18. Id.
 19. Id. at 8. 
 20. Id. at 7 (citations omitted). 
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the use of the 150,000 or so non-citizen personnel; it simply couldn’t be 
done. To do so would mean that the United States would somehow need to 
mass, train, equip, and transport an additional 150,000 to 200,000 personnel 
to fill all the combat and non-combat positions that would be left by a purge 
of contractors of this magnitude. 
The United States currently uses PMC personnel to “guard bases and 
diplomatic facilities, escort convoys and personnel, wash clothes and serve 
meals, maintain equipment and translate local languages, erect buildings 
and dig wells . . . . “21 To get to a more manageable number, this note will 
set aside those PMC personnel who work in logistics, food service, etc. and 
focus on those actively engaged in armed security functions. CENTCOM’s 
Armed Contractor Oversight Division estimates that as of May 2010 this 
subset of PMC personnel operating on contracts/subcontracts in 
Afghanistan numbered approximately 26,000, the vast majority of which are 
Afghan nationals.22
Ideally PMC personnel can be used to “[f]ree up military personnel for 
combat or other critical missions.”23 However, at least one PMC executive 
has suggested that the more politicized rationale behind reliance on PMCs 
could be to take focus off of the U.S. body count by drawing down troops 
and replacing where needed with PMC personnel.24 Regardless of the 
reasons, some PMCs now have “skills and experience that government 
agencies lack or possess only to a limited extent,”25 often because PMCs 
have been the default and have had opportunities to develop knowledge and 
skills that others have not.26
B. Cost Concerns 
With such heavy reliance on contractors, it is no wonder that “[f]or 
federal fiscal years 2002–2010 . . . . the reported value of funds obligated 
for contingency contracts for equipment, supplies, and support services is at 
least $154 billion for the DoD, $11 billion for the Department of State, and 
 21. Id.
 22. Sen. Carl. Levin (D-MI) Press Conference on Private Security Contractors in 
Afghanistan (C-SPAN television broadcast Oct. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Levin Press 
Conference], available at http://www.c-span.org/Events/Sen-Carl-Levin-D-MI-Press-
Conference-on-Private-Security-Contractors-in-Afghanistan/19234-1/. 
 23. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 8. 
 24. Frontline: Private Warriors (PBS television broadcast June 21, 2005), available 
at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/view/ (interview by Martin 
Smith with Andy Melville, Project Director, Erinys Iraq, in Red Zone of Baghdad in which 
Mr. Melville suggests that Erinys may have been used extensively by the Army Corp of 
Engineers as part of an overall troop drawdown by replacing U.S. troops with PMC 
personnel). 
 25. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 8. 
 26. Id. at 14.  
464 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:2 
$7 billion for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).”27
When one adds the “$5 billion in grants and cooperative agreements 
awarded by State and USAID” the total value becomes $177 billion.28 To 
put these figures in more comprehensible, concrete terms, the average cost 
per U.S. household for contractor support of contingency operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2010 was $1,505.29
Truly, there seems to be less consideration for costs and more 
importance placed on simply trying to get the task accomplished;30 however, 
with the reliance on contractors, the U.S. has essentially introduced another 
step where money can get lost or shuffled into the wrong hands. While there 
is no “single, definitive accounting of the extent of contingency-contract 
waste, fraud, and abuse,”31 the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq 
and Afghanistan recently estimated the number to be, conservatively, tens 
of billions of dollars.32 The Commission determined that estimates of fraud 
alone account for $12 billion,33 while recognizing that waste, while not as 
easily quantified, may account for substantially more U.S. taxpayer funds 
that have not reached their intended use.34
The reduced government staffing and increased responsibility mentioned 
above have aggravated what the Commission on Wartime Contracting calls 
the “toxic interplay [between] huge sums of money” and the 
“unprecedented reliance on contractors” in relatively small states.35 To put it 
bluntly, this interplay is made toxic because of “a decimated federal 
acquisition workforce; a military downsized in the 1990s, but now facing 
expanded and extended missions; limited deployability of federal civilians; 
and inadequate operational planning for using and monitoring 
contractors.”36 This toxic interplay has resulted in the convictions and guilty 
pleas of some contractor personnel for “bribe[s] solicitation[s], kickbacks, 
false invoicing, theft of government property, and money laundering in 
connection with contracting.”37
 27. Id. at 6 (citing Commission calculation from Federal Procurement Data System-
Next Generation data for Defense, State, and USAID contracts performed in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar). 
 28. Id. (citing Commission calculation from the www.USAspending.gov database 
(based on data from the Federal Assistance Award Data System, for grants and cooperative 
agreements performed in Iraq and Afghanistan)). 
 29. Id. at 10 fig.2. 
 30. Id. at 14. 
 31. CWC, At What Risk?, supra note 2, at 6. 
 32. Id. at 7. 
 33. Id. (applying an estimated 7% loss-of-revenue-to-fraud metric, established by the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners in its 2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational 
Fraud and Abuse, to the $177 billion in contingency contracts and grants at issue in Iraq and 
Afghanistan). 
 34. Id.
 35. Id. at 9. 
 36. Id. 
 37. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 8. 
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According to Senator Levin’s remarks at an October 2010 press 
conference, General Petraeus specifically warned a bipartisan commission 
that spending contracting funds too quickly, without sufficient oversight, 
would likely cause funds to be lost through corruption and criminal 
patronage and that some of these funds could even unintentionally end up in 
the hands of insurgents, thereby undermining U.S. objectives in 
Afghanistan.38
Kickbacks and bribes are bad enough, but having U.S. taxpayer dollars 
diverted to those who would kill U.S. troops is quite another matter. Yet, 
according to a recent bipartisan report, this has happened repeatedly in 
Afghanistan, and two task forces are currently investigating the matter.39
In his October 2010 press conference on the matter, Senator Levin 
provided some insight into these examples of U.S. taxpayer funds going to 
the Taliban and al Qaeda through Afghani warlords.40 One instance 
involved a U.S. Air Force contract with ArmorGroup (a subsidiary of G4S) 
in which funds went directly from contractor to subcontractor to Afghan 
warlords who then supplied personnel for a contracted security guard 
force.41 In that particular case, one warlord killed another (murder and 
bribery), and one warlord was killed in a U.S. military raid on a Taliban 
meeting that happened to be held at his house (U.S. funds flowing to those 
who would undercut U.S. objectives).42 A second instance involved a 
contract with EOD Technology in which one Afghan warlord was 
reportedly “playing both sides” in appearing to be supportive of both the 
Taliban and the U.S. military. 
Preventing U.S. funds from going to Afghan warlords or insurgents 
through patronage or poorly monitored contracts is essential, but there are 
concerns that removing such patronage payments to Afghan 
warlords/strongmen might make the situation on the ground in Afghanistan 
more dangerous for civilians and International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) troops.43 Senator Levin acknowledges that there may very well be 
times when military officials will have to utilize an individual or group that 
is not ideal but may be the “best that we can do” in a given situation.44
However, Levin insists that such a decision should not be left to those lower 
down in the military chain of command; if the U.S. military is to utilize 
strongmen, it must be a conscious decision from the very top.45 Senator 
Levin indicated that General Petraeus shared the concern that these types of 






 44. Levin Press Conference, supra note 22. 
 45. Id.
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decisions should not be left to lower level military officials,46 which is the 
case under the current system. 
C. Perceived Illegitimacy of Use of Force by PMCs 
Assuming that PMCs are the most “cost-effective for performing certain 
support functions,”47 which is certainly open for debate,48 and assuming that 
the military could properly oversee the formation and execution of contracts 
while still tending to their other, core objectives, there still remains the 
policy concern of whether or not the U.S. wants to continue to rely on 
PMCs. 
U.S. policy has historically evinced a preference for the citizen-soldier 
who, rather than being a professional soldier for hire, would be called upon 
when needed to resolve a conflict on behalf of his or her country and then 
return to civilian life after completing military service49 and take back up a 
life in business, agriculture, etc.50 In this way, the citizen-soldier represented 
the most effective compromise between an effective fighting force and a 
military that is least likely to interfere in the internal affairs of the nation.51
While this note does not suggest that the United States is in any immediate 
danger of PMCs staging a coup d’état, there is concern within the U.S. 
military that traditional military principles are being eroded by the 
increasing use of PMCs, even those comprised largely of former U.S. 
soldiers; the argument put forward by some of our own military officers has 
essentially been that associating the U.S. armed forces with commercial 
enterprises could compromise their professionalism.52 U.S. Army Colonel 
Bruce Grant is quoted as saying, “When former officers sell their skills on 
the international market for profit, the entire profession loses its moral high 
ground with the American people.”53 Legitimizing the security functions 
these contractor personnel perform by incorporating their tasks into the 
current military command structure, as this note suggests below, would 
arguably help to alleviate some of these concerns. 
 46. Id.
 47. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 8 (emphasis added). 
 48. Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 24 (e.g., meals at $20 per plate that get 
prepared and thrown away, the presence of multiple kinds of ice cream, or the presence of all 
manner of fast food options). 
 49. WATSON, supra note 15, at 12. 
 50. Id. at 28 (citation omitted). 
 51. Id. at 298. 
 52. SINGER, supra note 7, at 204 (citations omitted). 
 53. Id. (quoting BRUCE GRANT, ARMY WAR COLLEGE, U.S. MILITARY EXPERTISE FOR 
SALE: PRIVATE MILITARY CONSULTANTS AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY (1998), available at
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA344357). 
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D. Lack of Public Consciousness of Contractor Sacrifices 
Scholars have discussed the fact that the American public does not have 
a true sense of the scale of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan because 
contractor injuries and fatalities are not well reported or properly considered 
in the debate over the true cost of the war.54 For example, “[b]etween 
September 2001 and December 2010, over 2,200 contractor employees of 
all nationalities have died and over 49,800 were injured in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.”55 Even by early 2010, while U.S. contractor fatalities had 
reached only 2,008, it was estimated that adding these fatalities brought the 
total U.S. fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan to over 7,500.56 This figure is 
believed to be even higher, since the best estimate of contractor fatalities 
comes from the Labor Department’s Division of Longshore and Harbor 
Worker Compensation, which only tallies contractor deaths where families 
or employers file for insurance benefits.57 According to Steven Schooner, a 
professor at The George Washington University School of Law who has 
authored numerous works on the subject, these contractor fatalities should 
be considered more seriously.58
E. Coordination & Communication Issues with PMCs 
The decisions of PMC personnel can directly impact U.S. military 
operations, and yet PMC personnel are able to make and execute plans 
wholly outside of the existing military command structure. Take, for 
example, the widely reported killing of four American Blackwater 
contractors and the horrific mutilating of their bodies in Fallujah.59 The 
decision to send these contractors through Fallujah was made without 
regard to U.S. military strategy in the area and ultimately led the U.S. 
Marine Corps to enter the city on terms other than those they had 
 54. See, e.g., Schooner & Swan, supra note 13.  
 55. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 8 (“Actual casualties are undoubtedly 
higher, because federal statistics are based on filed insurance claims, which may not apply to 
many foreign contractors’ employees.”) (citing OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
PROGRAMS, DEP’T OF LABOR, DEFENSE BASE ACT CUMULATIVE REPORT BY NATION 
(09/01/2001—12/31/2010), available at www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallnation.htm). 
 56. Schooner & Swan, supra note 13, at 16. 
 57. Id. at 17. 
 58. See generally Steven L. Schooner, Why Contractor Fatalities Matter,
PARAMETERS, Autumn 2008, at 78; Steven L. Schooner, Op-Ed., Remember Them Too: 
Don’t Contractors Count When We Calculate the Costs of War?, WASH. POST, May 25, 
2009, at A21; Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Dead Contractors: The Un-Examined 
Effect of Surrogates on the Public’s Casualty Sensitivity, J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y
(forthcoming 2012). 
 59. Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 24. 
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determined were best for the overall mission.60 As Marine Col. John Toolan 
puts it: 
[The U.S. Marine Corps has] a tendency to want to be a little bit more sure 
about operating in an environment. We’re going to do the risk analysis, 
and we will, in most cases, opt to reduce the amount of violence. Whereas 
I think some of the contractors are motivated by the financial remuneration 
and the fact that they probably want to get someplace from point A to 
point B quickly, their tendency [is] to have a little more risk. So yes, we’re 
at odds [with contractors], but we can work it out. But it requires….having 
a joint coordination center where everybody is aware of the rules. And 
somebody has to be the big dog, and that needs to be us.61
Further muddying the waters in the above situation was the difficulty in 
tracking down who was ultimately responsible for the Blackwater 
contractors being in Fallujah when they were killed. Doing so would 
involve figuring out who was working for whom and it appears that 
Blackwater was contracted to provide security for ESS, the dining service 
subcontractor who was in turn hired by KBR through a Kuwaiti company 
named Regency.62 ESS claims that it was not working for KBR on March 
31st during the Fallujah attack and that the Kuwaiti company, Regency, has 
been reluctant to release any documentation.63 So ultimately it has been 
difficult to establish why those American contractors were even in Fallujah 
that night. 
To deal with the coordination and communication issues involving 
PMCs in Iraq, the U.S. brought in Aegis, itself a British PMC, to try to 
unify the other private security contractors.64 Even assuming that another 
private contractor could properly oversee the multitudes of other private 
contractors, cooperation between these private entities is still voluntary and 
is still outside the military chain of command. Additionally, this outsourcing 
to solve the problem of outsourcing seems counterintuitive65 and 
exemplifies how ingrained the reliance on private contractors has become. 
 60. Id. (Marine Col. John Toolan, reveals his frustration at having to change his 
plans to enter Fallujah: “The only reason why [going into Fallujah] bothered me is because 
we had developed a pretty detailed plan on how we were going to address the problem [of 
insurgency within the city]. And by those contractors being killed, that really forced us to put 
that aside and to opt for the more direct approach.”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.
 65. See SIMMS TABACK, THERE WAS AN OLD LADY WHO SWALLOWED A FLY (1997) 
(providing a simple, poignant, yet absurd example of how solving one problem with more of 
the same merely perpetuates an undesirable cycle). 
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F. Chain of Command & Accountability Issues with PMCs 
Retired USMC Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, a former base commander 
in Iraq, has expressed concern that private security contractors operating in 
Iraq create unsafe conditions; he believes that to the Iraqi population, these 
contractors represent the United States and that Iraqi civilians know that 
when these individuals kill civilians in the process of accomplishing a 
specific task they will not be held accountable.66 It stands to reason that 
Afghan civilians would have similar reactions. 
Andy Melville, Project Director for Erinys, Iraq, when asked who his 
company was accountable to, said that Erinys is accountable to coalition 
forces and insisted that Erinys is a “very professional and disciplined 
company.”67 However, Lawrence Peter, formerly in charge of regulating 
private security in Iraq for the U.S. government, and now a Private Security 
Association Representative (note the irony), admits that typically, any 
reprimand of private contractor personnel that does make its way back to 
the military would be handled between the contracts officer who hired that 
private security company and the private security company itself and not 
necessarily between the individual PMC employee and the military.68
Again, difficulties arise here in that the military must rely on cooperation 
from the PMC in order to even begin to determine which PMC employees 
may be responsible; the system simply does not provide the same checks 
and balances for PMC actions as it does for more traditional, public military 
forces.69
Congress has made several attempts to bring contractors into the fold of 
more traditional military accountability. For example, the 2007 Defense Bill 
sought to apply the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to private 
contractors accompanying the military in the field.70 Section 552, of 3510 
total sections in that bill, amends 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (article 2(a) of the 
UCMJ) by replacing the word “war” with the phrase “declared war or a 
contingency operation.”71 Additionally, Congress passed the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), which could have applied civilian 
law to contractor crimes in war zones; however, MEJA simply has not been 
used to that end because of the difficulties that civilian prosecutors here in 
the U.S. have in determining what is illegal activity in a conflict zone 9,000 
 66. Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 24. 
 67. Id.
 68. Id.
 69. E.g., SINGER, supra note 7, at 220-21. 
 70. Peter W. Singer, Frequently Asked Questions on the UCMJ Change and its 
Applicability to Private Military Contractors, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 12, 2007), 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0112defenseindustry_singer.aspx. 
 71. Peter W. Singer, The Law Catches Up to Private Militaries                                
Embeds, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 04, 2007),  
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/0104defenseindustry_singer.aspx (emphasis added).
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miles away and because of the funding and logistical problems associated 
with trying such a remote case.72 The reality is that from the inception of the 
war in Iraq until early 2007, “[n]ot one contractor of the entire military 
industry in Iraq [had] been charged with any crime . . . . let alone prosecuted 
or punished.”73 Similarly ineffective from a civil liability standpoint, the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) has found little use in holding private 
security contractors accountable in the United States because of the 
“government contractor defense.”74
G. Security Concerns 
Proper record keeping and vetting of security personnel is essential as 
evidenced by recent attacks by Taliban from within the Afghan security 
forces.75 Even some security companies, like U.K. based ArmorGroup, have 
admitted that the industry as a whole needs to take greater care in properly 
vetting potential employees.76 Yet, a recent DoD audit by the Inspector 
General (IG) examining the life cycle of contractor Common Access Cards 
(CACs) found weaknesses in the system that could “result in unauthorized 
access to DoD resources, installations, and sensitive information 
worldwide.”77 As a specific example: 
DoDIG auditors found that better Army oversight is required for a KBR 
Realtime Automated Personnel Identification System site that issued 
25,428 CACs to contractors deploying to Southwest Asia. According to 
the audit, a KBR subcontractor did background checks with no Army 
oversight; a contractor facilitated a CAC approval process that bypassed 
Contractor Verification System; and nearly half of revoked CACs were not 
recovered. Furthermore, contractors were misclassified as government 
employees on their CACs. Specifically, 40,055 contractor CACs indicated 
the holders had General Schedule pay grades, and 211,851 had e-mail 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.
 74. DAVID ISENBERG, SHADOW FORCE: PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ 129 
(2009) (describing the failed attempts by Iranian citizens to hold U.S. government 
contractors civilly liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for civilian deaths resulting from 
the U.S. Navy’s 1988 downing of an Iranian passenger with a contractor built ship and 
weapons system). 
 75. The Situation Room: Man Opens Fire on Americans in Kabul (CNN television 
broadcast Apr. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/04/27/afghanistan.violence/index.html?hpt=T2 
(describing attacks by insurgents in official Afghan police uniforms, the large numbers of 
uniforms that had been confiscated on raids in and around Kabul, the Taliban’s stated 
priority of infiltrating security forces, and the woefully inaccurate records—181,000 Afghan 
police in the national database as compared to only 125,000 actual personnel). 
 76. ISENBERG, supra note 74, at 105 (citing Thomas Catan, Call to Vet Security 
Companies Working Overseas, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Sep. 29, 2004). 
 77. INSPECTOR GEN. GORDON S. HEDDELL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SEMIANNUAL REPORT 
TO THE CONGRESS 29 (2011) (discussing control of Common Access Cards). 
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addresses that improperly identified the holders as U.S. government 
employees.78
In some cases, the improper background checks of foreign nationals 
working on U.S. military bases or for the U.S. military in the region are a 
result of the lack of accurate records in the individuals’ home countries, 
where such records of the kind typically used simply do not exist.79
Given the security card issue above, would it be so far-fetched to 
imagine that an individual or group determined to harm U.S. interests or 
personnel in the region would potentially be able to get a hold of one of 
these cards or evade a proper background check and drive a car loaded with 
explosives through the gate at some forward operating base? If the author of 
this work has thought of it, it seems plausible that someone with much more 
sinister motives may have thought of it as well. 
II. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Overview 
While President Obama’s administration and Afghani President Karzai 
share a stated goal of a 2014 transfer of security operations to the Afghan 
government, Secretary of Defense Gates has indicated that this does not 
necessarily mean a complete withdrawal of all U.S. troops by 2014.80 Even 
as the U.S. prepares for initial troop drawdowns beginning in July 2011, it is 
likely that there will be a continued need for U.S. presence to train and 
support Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) for years to come.81 In 
fact, the Commission on Wartime Contracting, in its recently released fifth 
special report, recommends immediate actions be taken to secure the gains 
in security, infrastructure, and programs that have been made to date in 
Afghanistan or else risk wasting years of hard work and sacrifices and 
billions of dollars as U.S. troops withdraw before the Afghan government 
has the capacity to maintain those gains on its own.82
 78. Id.
 79. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-351, CONTINGENCY CONTRACT 
MANAGEMENT: DOD NEEDS TO DEVELOP AND FINALIZE BACKGROUND SCREENING AND 
OTHER STANDARDS FOR PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS 1 (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09351.pdf  
 80. Viola Gienger, Afghan ‘War-Weariness’ in U.S. Won’t Damp Intention to 
Succeed, Gates Says, BLOOMBERG (June 4, 2011, 6:35 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-04/afghan-war-weariness-in-u-s-won-t-damp-
intention-to-succeed-gates-says.html. 
 81. See id.; COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & AFG., SPECIAL REPORT 
NO. 5, SUSTAINABILITY: HIDDEN COSTS RISK NEW WASTE 1 (2011) [hereinafter CWC, 
SUSTAINABILITY], available at http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_SpecialRepor 
t5.pdf. 
 82. See CWC, SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 81. 
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It is in light of the projected need for continued U.S. presence in 
Afghanistan through at least 2014 and the Commission on Wartime 
Contracting’s “extensive deliberation[s]” calling for “sweeping reforms” to 
the current PMC structure that this note suggests a U.S. Foreign Legion as 
one possible method to bring about fundamental change that the 
Commission on Wartime contracting suggests “must be made.”83 The 
Commission specifically suggested increasing “responsibility and 
accountability for contracting outcomes” as a way to correct for the negative 
results of U.S. overreliance on private contractor personnel.84 The 
Commission then goes through and proposes over thirty changes, most of 
them alterations within the current contractor-reliant scheme.85
This note focuses narrowly, and builds on two of the most fundamental 
suggested changes; first, the growth of “organic capacity”86 on the part of 
government agencies which currently rely on contractors and secondly, a 
specific corollary to this increase in organic capacity, “restricting [the] 
reliance on contractors for security.”87
Former General McChrystal, in statements to Senate Armed Services 
Chairman Levin, made it clear that he did not believe PMCs were 
appropriate for a country like Afghanistan that is trying to grow law and 
order.88 Secretary of State Clinton has pointed out that “[s]ometimes 
contracting makes sense and does make us more efficient and flexible. But 
there are core governmental functions that should always be performed by 
public servants, not private companies.”89 This note takes the position that 
security operations are one of these core governmental functions that should 
not be handled by private contractors. As such, this note suggests expanding 
the responsibility and accountability of what is now being handled by 
contractors by removing security functions entirely from the sphere of 
contracting and placing them squarely within the existing U.S. military 
command structure where such core governmental functions belong. 
Certainly this would constitute a “sweeping reform[],”90 that the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting suggests is needed. Although, it is 
admittedly a more fundamental change than simply retooling an existing 
contractor centered approach. 
 83. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at Foreword. 
 84. Id.
 85. See generally id.
 86. Id. at 2 (recommending increased organic capacity as the very first of over thirty 
proposed solutions to over-reliance on contractors). 
 87. Id. (recommending restrictions on use of contractors for security as the third of 
over thirty proposed solutions to over-reliance on contractors). 
 88. Levin Press Conference, supra note 22. 
 89. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 12 (quoting Sec’y of State Hillary 
Clinton, Briefing on Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (Dec.15, 2010)). 
 90. Id. at Foreword (quoting the Commission in its determination that only 
“sweeping reforms” will be enough to make necessary changes to reduce overreliance on 
contractors). 
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Any suggestion that the U.S. incorporate security functions back into its 
own military must address the reality that many of these positions are now 
held by PMC employees who are non-citizen foreign nationals.91
Recognizing that one of the underlying causes for reliance on PMCs for 
security is a lack of organic capacity,92 and further recognizing that it may 
not be possible to grow this capacity rapidly enough to fill the void that 
would be left by abandoning the use of PMCs, this note proposes that if the 
U.S. is to remain in Afghanistan and a continued reliance on non-citizen 
private security contractor personnel is required, that the U.S. bring these 
individuals within the purview of the existing U.S. military command 
structure via the proposed “U.S. Foreign Legion.” Doing so would serve to 
legitimize the roles that these individuals currently fulfill, would more 
accurately reflect the sacrifices being made by these individuals, more 
appropriately reward them for their service, and is in keeping with current 
trends in domestic U.S. laws. 
B. How Proposed Solution Addresses Problems Within Current PMC 
System 
1. Legitimizing use of force 
International perception of private security contractors must be balanced 
against U.S. security concerns. Late in 2010, President Obama welcomed 
criticism from President Karzai regarding the perception of “heavy-
handedness” on the part of private security contractors in Afghanistan. 
However, while President Obama recognized President Karzai’s concerns as 
“perfectly appropriate,” he stated that he “can’t send U.S. aid workers or 
civilians into areas where [he] can’t guarantee their safety.”93 President 
Obama stressed that he had to “think practically” about operations in 
Afghanistan.94
Thinking practically, the need for continued security will likely persist. 
Until Afghanistan is capable of handling security internally, utilizing a 
formal U.S. military force would meet the practical needs of securing a 
nation while avoiding some of the harshest criticisms about the 
accountability of PMC personnel. A U.S. Foreign Legion would hold 
Legionnaires to the same high standards as other U.S. military personnel 
 91. See id. at 7 (citations omitted). 
 92. Id. at 13-15, 17. 
 93. Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Remarks at the NATO 
Summit Presidential Press Conference (Nov. 22, 2010) [hereinafter NATO Press 
Conference], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-
video/video/2010/11/20/nato-summit-presidential-press-conference (President Obama 
responding to a question from Karen DeYoung regarding President Karzai’s concerns over 
private security contractors in Afghanistan (beginning at 15:07)). 
 94. Id.
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and would likely avoid some of the criticisms of “heavy-handedness.” 
Where problems arose, they could be dealt with under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice in the same way disciplinary actions are handled for U.S. 
military personnel. 
2. Increased Accountability Through Chain of Command 
Some scholars have expressed concerns that “certain tasks, such as 
prisoner interrogation, are too sensitive to be outsourced to the private 
sector without proper government oversight.”95 Pratap Chatterjee, a Visiting 
Fellow at the Center for American Progress, testified on May 2, 2011 at a 
public forum before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and strongly suggested that the U.S. needs better methods of 
tracking personnel, funding, and supplies.96 Mr. Chatterjee has spent a 
considerable amount of time studying the issue and is specifically 
concerned with “the lack of inventory tracking of weapons and ammunition 
that were supplied by contractors, and the theft and misuse of the weapons 
by security forces” as well as “the unqualified translators [the U.S.] hired 
through L-3/Titan, the inexperienced police officers through DynCorp, and 
the payments that Third Country Nationals have to make to labor brokers to 
get jobs on bases.”97
When asked about U.S. actions in Fallujah, Iraq following the death of 
four Blackwater PMC personnel, Marine Col. John Toolan suggested that 
the military’s original plans for working with local leaders in Fallujah to 
minimize violence were thrown to the wayside when those contractors 
drove through the city without communicating their intent or location to the 
military. This was a highly publicized example of what can go wrong in the 
interplay between PMC and military actions through a lack of 
communication. 
The U.S. military works to minimize these issues through a regional 
command structure, which brings multiple military branches together to 
work under a single, unified regional commander.98 In Afghanistan, this 
duty falls to Central Command, which has responsibility for gathering and 
 95. ISENBERG, supra note 74, at 136 (describing the lesson learned from the Abu 
Ghraib prison scandal as being that the potential for human rights violations require prisons 
to be staffed by military, rather than PMC, personnel while lamenting the continued reliance 
on PMC staff resulting from shortages of qualified military personnel). 
 96. Pratap Chatterjee, Visiting Fellow, Center for American Progress, Statement 
before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (May 2, 2011), 
available at http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/forum2011-05-02_statement-
Chatterjee.pdf (“We need accurate data on everything from the workers we use to the goods 
and services we purchase.”). 
 97. Id.
 98. WATSON, supra note 15, at 7. 
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disseminating data and coordinating efforts in that region.99 While there 
have been attempts to contract out a similar function for PMCs that would 
both coordinate the actions of the multitudes of PMCs amongst themselves 
and between PMC actions and those of the military, such efforts have not 
been widely successful.100 This note suggests placing PMC personnel 
directly under U.S. Central Command thereby potentially avoiding the 
action-reaction scenario seen in Fallujah; the military would be able to plan 
its moves without having to react directly to the actions of PMC personnel 
or indirectly to the repercussions of PMC personnel actions. 
3. Improved Coordination Toward Accomplishing Mission 
Objectives 
The proposed U.S. Foreign Legion is a unique solution to the concerns of 
military command and those who study these issues because, instead of 
trying to supplant the large numbers of PMC personnel, it would overlay a 
proper chain of command and increased accountability atop of an existing 
force. The U.S. Foreign Legion would be structured and incorporated into 
the existing U.S. military and in this way would have the type of top-down 
decision making that Senator Levin and General Petraeus suggest is 
necessary to avoid compromising overall mission strategy at the lower 
levels of military command.101
Additionally, since some of the current contractor personnel have more 
experience in theater than U.S. military personnel,102 the proposed solution 
here is to essentially co-opt that expertise and bring it into the folds (or back 
into the folds where PMC personnel are former military personnel) of the 
existing military command structure. Regardless of whether or not the initial 
contracting was a sound decision, this solution takes the best of what has 
come from it and moves forward. 
Instead of spreading these experienced personnel across dozens of 
different organizations with different objectives and no real central 
command,103 the proposed U.S. Foreign Legion would provide a means by 
which the U.S. could channel the efforts of these individuals toward major 
objectives. Placing these individuals under one command structure would 
put the overall mission command back in the hands of senior military 
officials whose job it is to guide the overall mission towards success rather 
than leaving the bulk of the decision making to private entities and lower 
 99. Gen. James N. Mattis, Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
About the Posture of U.S. Central Command (Mar. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/posture-statement/. 
 100. Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 24. 
101. Levin Press Conference, supra note 22. 
 102. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 15. 
 103. Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 24 (describing the contracting out of 
attempts to organize contractors). 
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level military officials with disparate interests and goals.104 An added 
benefit from this system might well be further cost savings as fewer funds 
may be lost to waste, fraud, etc. and where efforts can be streamlined and 
duplicated efforts could be avoided. 
4. Reductions in Overall Cost, Waste, and Fraud 
As described above, the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) 
estimates that U.S. taxpayers have lost $12 billion to fraud by using PMCs 
to support contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.105 The CWC 
suggests that waste, while not necessarily quantifiable, may well cause even 
more U.S. taxpayer funds to be diverted from their intended uses.106
This note suggests essentially removing the middleman from the 
equation. Instead of having prices set by a corporation looking to profit 
from conflict, the proposed U.S. Foreign Legion would pay its members 
directly for their services and in this way reduce the chance that funds 
would be squandered in the process. Additionally, the opportunity to “pad 
accounts” would likely be reduced if the money was kept “in-house.” 
Of course, the tighter controls on funds would likely also help avoid 
blatant abuses akin to instances where Blackwater personnel cashed in on 
fraudulent receipts for fuel or expensed prostitution.107 While some 
individual U.S. Foreign Legionnaires might inevitably spend their pay on 
illicit activities,108 an individual’s choices would reflect less negatively on 
an institution than when the vice is expensed and billed directly to Uncle 
Sam. 
Costs for proposed U.S. Foreign Legion could be roughly approximated 
by multiplying pay for individual U.S. Foreign Legionnaires by number of 
Legionnaires needed. For purposes of this note, a very crude approximation 
could be made by taking the number of PMC personnel currently devoted to 
security functions and assuming a similar number of U.S. Foreign 
Legionnaires would be needed to replace the PMCs. To approximate this 
cost, the U.S. could look to its own internal pay scales,109 to pay scales of 
 104. See Levin Press Conference, supra note 22. 
 105. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 7 (applying an estimated 7% loss-of-
revenue-to-fraud metric, established by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners in its 
2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, to the $177 billion in 
contingency contracts and grants at issue in Iraq and Afghanistan). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Suit: Prostitute, Strippers Part of Blackwater Fraud, CNN JUSTICE (Feb. 12, 
2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/02/12/blackwater.suit/index.html?iref=allsearch. 
 108. See, e.g., ADRIAN D. GILBERT, VOICES OF THE FOREIGN LEGION: THE HISTORY OF 
THE WORLD’S MOST FAMOUS FIGHTING CORPS 85—88 (2010) (describing rampant 
prostitution accompanying the French Foreign Legion on campaign). 
 109. Basic Pay: Active Duty Soldiers, U.S. ARMY,
http://www.goarmy.com/benefits/money/basic-pay-active-duty-soldiers.html (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2012) (listing baseline Army pay); 2011 Pay Table, DEF. FIN. & ACCOUNTING SERV., 
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similar foreign military forces,110 and to current pay for PMC personnel111 in 
order to estimate the pay for U.S. Foreign Legionnaires. 
As a baseline, current pay for enlisted non-officer U.S. military 
personnel in the Army and Navy ranges from $17,611 ($1,467 per month) 
for an E1 with less than 2 years’ experience up to $34,088 ($2,840 per 
month) for an E6 with 6 years of experience.112 Using these figures, a low-
end annual estimate for the salaries of a 150,000 strong113 U.S. Foreign 
Legion would be anywhere from about $2.6 billion to $5.1 billion. 
The French Foreign Legion currently pays its Legionnaires a similar 
range based upon years of service, rank, and division within the Legion.114
The pay for French Foreign Legionnaires starts at €1,043 (approximately 
$1,345) per month and goes up to €1,205 to €3,567 (approximately $1,554 
to $4,601) per month for Legionnaires with between 10 months and 3 years 
of service.115 Comparing these numbers to those for members of the U.S. 
military makes it clear that the French Foreign Legionnaires are generally 
compensated at a level the U.S. is comfortable with. 
Many other factors would impact the ultimate cost of this proposed 
solution, but these figures provide a baseline estimate and the potential for a 
more definite and quantifiable cost structure. Additionally, the proposed 
U.S. Foreign Legion would solve some of the disparity in pay for 
individuals in positions now occupied by PMC personnel where Nepalese 
Gurkhas make around $50 per day while other PMC personnel make $500 
or more.116
5. Improved Recognition for PMC Personnel and Their 
Sacrifices 
Historically, pay for French Foreign Legionnaires was abysmal and 
brought out all manner of infighting and divisive behavior that would not 
serve to improve unit cohesion or morale.117 A more equitable pay scale in 
the proposed U.S. Foreign Legion would more adequately recognize the 
http://www.dfas.mil/dms/dfas/militarymembers/pdf/MilPayTable2011.pdf (listing baseline 
Navy pay). 
 110. See, e.g., Pay, FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION, http://www.legion-
recrute.com/en/salaires.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (detailing the basic pay range for 
French Foreign Legionnaires). 
 111. Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 24. 
 112. Basic Pay: Active Duty Soldiers, supra note 109. 
 113. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 7 (citations omitted). 
 114. Pay, FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION, supra note 110. 
 115. Id.; World Currencies, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/data/currencies/ (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2012) (showing last trade conversion rate at 1 euro to 1.29 U.S. dollars). 
 116. See, e.g., The Baghdad Boom, ECONOMIST (Mar. 25, 2004), 
http://www.economist.com/node/2539816; Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 24. 
 117. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 74. 
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efforts and sacrifices of some members while trying to build a more 
cohesive environment among the Legionnaires as a whole.
Some in this country even have concerns that the U.S. military generally
operates as a vehicle for the less educated and less wealthy to protect the 
interests of the wealthy, with a disproportionate number of minorities 
enlisting.118 The proposed U.S. Foreign Legion would likely have many 
individuals from less well developed nations and from economically 
depressed backgrounds. However, without minimizing this concern, the 
proposed U.S. Foreign Legion is not creating this problem. These 
individuals already serve in large numbers as PMC personnel and would 
receive more adequate recognition and compensation for their actions 
through the proposed U.S. Foreign Legion. Not to mention that many 
foreign nationals currently serve on active duty within the existing branches 
of the U.S. military.119
Improved compensation for foreign nationals who serve the U.S. would 
help properly recognize their efforts. Providing citizenship options to those 
who take up arms for the U.S. would potentially represent an even greater 
recognition of their sacrifices. Extending improved citizenship options to 
those U.S. Foreign Legionnaires who were interested would also be more in 
keeping with the theoretical ideal of the citizen-soldier. While this concept 
is not universally accepted, general historical concepts of citizenship in the 
United States have involved the notion that one “cannot be a fully 
functional citizen without being willing to put down the plow and take up 
the rifle to defend one’s home, standard of living, and life.”120 This note 
suggests offering the option of citizenship to those who already put down 
their proverbial plows and pick up rifles to defend our way of life without 
such recognition. 
The suggestions in this paper are intended to be narrowly tailored and 
pragmatic, not xenophobic. If one believes that the underlying system is 
fundamentally flawed, which is in no way the thrust of this note, the 
suggestions contained in this paper still represent a marked improvement by 
compensating private contractor personnel in a manner that does not span a 
10 plus fold disparity based on national origin,121 ensures that all personnel 
have access to basic equipment,122 and that more commensurately 
recognizes the sacrifices that these individuals are increasingly making on 
 118. See WATSON, supra note 15, at 17-19. 
 119. See discussion infra Part III.D.i. 
 120. WATSON, supra note 15, at 13. 
 121. Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 24 (describing pay for former Gurkha 
private security personnel at $50 per day versus U.S. & U.K. pay contractor personnel 
earning up to $500 to $1000 per day). 
 122. SHADOW COMPANY (Purpose Films 2006) (highlighting disparity in equipment 
between PMC personnel and official U.S. military personnel). 
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behalf of the United States.123 This is especially important in Afghanistan 
where contractor fatalities increased from 36 percent of 2009 fatalities to 56 
percent of 2010 fatalities.124 Furthermore, formally recognizing the actions 
of these individuals and supporting these non-citizen soldiers and their 
families would not leave them to rely on private aid organizations for 
support when they retire from service or are killed or wounded in action.125
6. Improved Security via Proper Vetting of Personnel 
The U.S. military conducts numerous physical, medical, and criminal 
background checks on recruits before even allowing them to enlist.126 The 
goal is to ensure that the U.S. military is comprised of strong, healthy troops 
with good moral character who are dedicated to the defense of the nation.127
PMC personnel on the other hand take no oaths, often do not need to pass 
the same physical tests, and certainly are not always held to the same 
stringent standards for background checks that U.S. military personnel are 
held to.128
These individuals already serve in many of the same areas, and indeed 
inside many of the same secured facilities, as U.S. personnel. It is only 
logical to require that they be vetted in the same manner as their military 
counterparts. While there is no guarantee that proper screening of security 
personnel would prevent any and all sabotage,129 a lack of proper screening 
unnecessarily subjects U.S. personnel, and the greater U.S. mission, to 
 123. Schooner & Swan, supra note 13, at 17 (discussing the increasing percentage of 
fatalities that contract personnel represent in Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years; from 4% 
in 2003 to 53% in the first half of 2010). 
 124. Id. at 18 (based on the first half of 2010). 
 125. See, e.g., GURKHA WELFARE TRUST, http://www.gwt.org.uk/ (last visited Jan. 21, 
2012) (an organization created to support former Gurkhas who fought bravely for the U.K. 
without any formal support thereafter). 
 126. See “A Day at the Meps,” U.S. MILITARY ENTRANCE PROCESSING COMMAND,
http://www.mepcom.army.mil/dayatmeps/transcript.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2012). 
 127. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 6-22, ARMY LEADERSHIP: COMPETENT,
CONFIDENT, AND AGILE viii (2006); “A Day at the Meps,” supra note 126. 
 128. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 7, at 160, 162; CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, 
at 8; Levin Press Conference, supra note 22 (discussing U.S. taxpayer funds being funneled 
to the Taliban and al Qaeda through Afghani warlords); Frontline: Private Warriors, supra 
note 24 (interviewing USMC Col. John Toolan, who contrasts USMC operations with those 
of private contractors within his area of command; retired USMC Col. Thomas X. Hammes, 
who expresses concerns that Iraqi civilians see PMC personnel as unaccountable for civilian 
casualties; and Lawrence Peter, a Private Security Association Representative, who admits 
that accountability for PMC personnel misconduct would be handled between a contracts 
officer and the PMC firm rather than between the PMC employee and the U.S. military). 
 129. See, e.g., Steve Inskeep & Quil Lawrence, Karzai’s Half-Brother Assassinated in 
Kandahar (NPR radio broadcast July 12, 2011), available at
http://www.npr.org/2011/07/12/137784161/karzais-half-brother-assassinated-in-kandahar 
(describing the assassination of President Hamid Karzai’s brother by a trusted security 
official inside a secure compound). 
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threats that could be reduced if those security personnel were cleared in the 
same way their current U.S. counterparts are. 
Subjecting all would-be U.S. Foreign Legionnaires to more stringent 
screening processes than those faced by current PMC personnel may pose 
some difficulties where recruits hale from parts of the world with less 
thorough record-keeping, but a good faith effort must be made even if it 
means losing some otherwise qualified personnel in exchange for improved 
security. Worth noting is that the French Foreign Legion already subjects all 
of its potential recruits to roughly three weeks of assessment which includes 
physical, intellectual, and psychological testing, as well as a rigorous 
security screening process.130
C. Examples of State Military Units Comprised of Foreign Nationals 
In implementing a U.S. Foreign Legion, the U.S. should review 
historical examples of military forces comprised of non-citizen foreign 
nationals. The two most prominent examples are the French Foreign Legion 
and the British and Indian Gurkhas. These military units both have long, 
storied histories and are still seeing active duty today.131 Studying the 
success and failures of these organizations would help the U.S. in 
structuring its forces by borrowing from them what works and avoiding 
what has proven problematic. 
1. French Foreign Legion 
When individuals think of a national military unit comprised of non-
citizen soldiers, the first thought is probably of the romanticized French 
Foreign Legion. Historically, the French Foreign Legion has been made up 
of individuals seeking a fresh start,132 individuals looking for a unique 
challenge,133 or those for whom the Legion offered a reprieve from absolute 
poverty;134 even today, the French Foreign Legion still provides the 
opportunity for some to escape and make a fresh start.135
 130. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 20-22 (quoting a former French Foreign Legionnaire 
who described the security screening as a series of Gestapo-like interrogations where “if any 
aspect of your story didn’t gel, you were out”). 
 131. See generally id. (history of the French Foreign Legion); DAVID JORDAN, THE 
HISTORY OF THE FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION FROM 1831 TO THE PRESENT DAY 92—109 (2005) 
(history of the French Foreign Legion); JOHN PARKER, THE GURKHAS: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
THE WORLD’S MOST FEARED SOLDIERS (1999); TONY GOULD, IMPERIAL WARRIORS: BRITAIN 
AND THE GURKHAS (1999); E.D. SMITH, JOHNNY GURKHA: ‘FRIENDS IN THE HILLS’ (1985); 
SANDRO TUCCI, GURKHAS (1985). 
 132. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 16. 
 133. Id. at 13-16.
 134. Id. at 16-17.
 135. Neil Tweedie, The French Foreign Legion—the last option for those desperate to 
escape the UK, TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 3, 2008, 
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While French Foreign Legionnaires were historically not allowed to 
operate in regular French army artillery or cavalry units because of fears 
that they would abandon these critical posts,136 the modern Legion has 
proven itself a loyal and capable force in modern hostilities.137
To the extent that the French Foreign Legion was created by royal 
ordinance,138 it may not provide the best legal framework for a similar 
fighting force under the U.S. legal system. However, as a force with such a 
lengthy history that still sees active combat operations around the world,139
it provides a unique case study and this note borrows from the French 
experience often in discussing the potential for a U.S. Foreign Legion. 
2. British and Indian Gurkhas 
“If a man says he is not afraid of dying, he is either lying or he is a 
Gurkha.”140
Historically, Gurkha troops have fought bravely for the British in 
Afghanistan.141 Active duty Gurkha troops have continued to serve in 
Afghanistan with the British military142 and many former Gurkhas work 
with PMC contractors.143 However, despite their renown for valor and 
courage, even former Gurkha soldiers have been known to abandon a 
mission when working as private contractors.144 Compare, for example, the 
withdrawal of ex-Gurkha private contractors from hostilities in Sierra Leone 
following the mutilation of their commander145 with the resolve of colonial 
British Gurkha troops to continue fighting in a historic battle in Afghanistan 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/3546207/The-French-Foreign-
Legion-the-last-option-for-those-desperate-to-escape-the-UK.html. 
 136. SINGER, supra note 7, at 302 n.47. 
 137. JORDAN, supra note 131 (giving a brief overview of French Foreign Legionnaire 
involvement in widely varied and highly specialized missions across the globe). 
 138. Id. at 8, 19 (describing the initial creation of the French Foreign Legion by royal 
ordinance in 1831 and the subsequent founding of the ‘modern’ French Foreign Legion by 
royal ordinance in 1835). 
 139. See generally GILBERT, supra note 108; JORDAN, supra note 131.
 140. Who Are Gurkhas, GURKHA WELFARE TRUST, http://www.gwt.org.uk/about-
gurkhas/what-are-gurkhas/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2012) (quoting former Chief of Staff of the 
Indian Army, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw). 
 141. See, e.g., TONY GOULD, IMPERIAL WARRIORS: BRITAIN AND THE GURKHAS 126 
(1999); PARKER, supra note 131 64, 116-17. 
 142. See, e.g., Prince Harry Made Honorary Gurkha by Fearsome Warriors He 
Served with in Afghanistan, MAIL ONLINE,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1082172/Prince-Harry-honorary-
Gurkha-fearsome-warriors-served-Afghanistan.html (last updated Oct. 31, 2008). 
 143. See, e.g., The Baghdad Boom, supra note 116. 
 144. SINGER, supra note 7, at 112-13 (describing a PMF comprised of primarily ex-
Gurkha fighters breaking a contract and abandoning the contracted mission after they 
suffered heavy casualties and had their commander killed and mutilated in combat against 
the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone in 1995). 
 145. Id.
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despite similar mutilation of their commander.146 This comparison 
highlights the disparity in dedication to mission accomplishment between 
private security contractors and officially sanctioned military operations. 
With the Gurkhas as a prominent example, it seems that troops are more 
dedicated to a mission if more than money is at stake. 
While both the French Foreign Legionnaires and the British and Indian 
Gurkha Regiments are formal military forces comprised of foreign 
nationals, there are significant differences. Where French Foreign 
Legionnaires are soldiers from around the world, the Gurkha regiments of 
the British and Indian Armies are exclusively composed of Nepalese 
nationals147 with some British or Indian officers.148
Additionally, whereas the French Foreign Legion was created by a royal 
ordinance,149 the terms and conditions under which the Gurkhas served were 
initially left entirely up to the Indian authorities and were not codified under 
British law150 until the “Tripartite Agreement of 1947 between the UK, 
India and Nepal” more formally laid down these terms and conditions.151
While the Tripartite Agreement of 1947 (TPA) does not address every detail 
of Gurkhas’ service, it is a “series of documents comprising a 
Memorandum, a number of Annexes and several trilateral and bilateral 
exchanges between the three Governments” that addresses major aspects of 
service, including “pay, pensions and allowances, leave, children’s 
education and provisions to meet religious, national and cultural 
observances.”152
Under the TPA, British Gurkha basic pay rates are linked directly to the 
Indian Army Pay Code (IPC); formal reports every 10 years are used to 
update that pay scale while any interim changes to the Pay Code are made 
as India notifies the U.K.153 Cost of living allowances for Gurkhas serving 
outside of Nepal, known as Universal Addition (UA), are also given in 
 146. PARKER, supra note 131, at 116-17 (recounting the take-no-prisoners response 
that came from a platoon of Gurkha soldiers who found the castrated and mutilated body of 
their British officer following a battle in the Khyber Pass region in the summer of 1935). 
 147. See CLAIR TAYLOR, INT’L AFFAIRS & DEFENCE SECTION OF HOUSE OF COMMONS,
GURKHAS: TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE, 2009, H.C. 4671, at 4 (U.K.) [hereinafter 
GURKHAS: TERMS AND CONDITIONS], available at www.parliament.uk/briefing-
papers/SN04671.pdf. 
 148. E.D. SMITH, JOHNNY GURKHA: ‘FRIENDS IN THE HILLS’ 166-69 (1985); see also
PARKER, supra note 131, at 39-42, 105-07; TONY GOULD, IMPERIAL WARRIORS: BRITAIN AND 
THE GURKHAS 236 (1999) (describing historical WWI command structure in Gurkha 
battalions as having only British officers). 
 149. JORDAN, supra note 131, at 8, 19. 
 150. GURKHAS: TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 147, at 4. 
 151. Id. at 1, 4. 
 152. Id. at 4. 
 153. Id. at 5. 
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order to try and ensure that net take-home pay is the same for Gurkhas 
independent of where they serve.154
Pensions are handled in much the same way, with periodic adjustments 
tied to the Indian Army Pension Code with annual increases for cost of 
living.155 Additionally, the British and Indian militaries have established 
systems for doling out pensions to retired Gurkha servicemembers in ways 
that try to accommodate their location. Those who live close to the major 
Nepalese cities of Kathmandu, Pokhara, and Itahari either receive pensions 
through direct deposit or collect regular checks from one of three regional 
Pension Paying Offices.156 Those in more remote communities are able to 
collect their pensions quarterly from one of 24 Area Welfare Centres dotted 
throughout Nepal near ex-Gurkha population centers.157
Under the original TPA, Gurkhas remained Nepalese citizens and were 
required to resettle in Nepal at the conclusion of their service in the 
Brigades.158 There was virtually no real citizenship option for retiring 
Gurkhas to settle in the U.K.159 In 2009, after several years of legal 
wrangling, the U.K. provided all Gurkhas with the right to apply to settle in 
the U.K. at the end of their service, presuming they have served for at least 
four years.160
Despite the routine adjustment of pensions and cost of living allowances, 
there are still criticisms of the pension structure; the British Gurkha Welfare 
Society contends that an estimated 24,000 Nepalese Gurkhas who served 
the British before 1997 currently receive only one third of the typical British 
military pension.161
While the existing Gurkha pension system provides an interesting case 
study, the implementation of a pension system for the proposed U.S. 
Foreign Legion presents a very real cost concern and would require in-depth 
analysis. Any system would need to be carefully structured to be sustainable 
while appropriately recognizing those who have served. 
 154. Id.
 155. Id.
 156. GURKHAS: TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 147, at 6. 
 157. Id.
 158. ARABELLA THORP & JOHN WOODHOUSE, HOME AFFAIRS SECTION OF HOUSE OF 
COMMONS, IMMIGRATION: SETTLEMENT AND BRITISH CITIZENSHIP FOR DISCHARGED GURKHAS 
AND COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, 2009, H.C. 4399, at 1 (U.K.) 
[hereinafter HOUSE OF COMMONS, IMMIGRATION], available at www.parliament.uk/briefing-
papers/SN04399.pdf. 
 159. Id. at 1, 7. 
 160. See id.
 161. UK Hails Ruling on Gurkha Pensions, EKANTIPUR.COM (Jan. 11, 2010), 
http://202.166.193.40/2010/01/11/capital/uk-hails-ruling-on-gurkha-pensions/306206.html. 
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D. Current Domestic Support for U.S. Foreign Legion 
1. Building on the Status Quo 
This proposal is not a new concept; “non-citizens have fought in the U.S. 
Armed Forces since the Revolutionary War.”162 Nor is this a concept 
relegated to historical accounts. Currently, Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC) places the estimated number of non-citizens serving on active duty 
with the U.S. military at 35,000, with 12,000 more serving in either the 
National Guard or the and Reserve.163 Broken down by military branch, 
approximately 15,800 non-citizen personnel serve as Sailors with the U.S. 
Navy, 6,440 Marines are non-citizens, the Army is home to 5,596 non-
citizen Soldiers, and the Air Force has a contingent of 3,056 non-citizen 
Airmen,164 all of this with an estimated 8,000 additional non-citizens with 
green cards enlisting every year.165
The reality is that the suggestion in this paper does not represent as 
radical a departure from the status quo as it may seem. This note suggests a 
U.S. Foreign Legion that draws on the experiences of all branches of the 
U.S. military with non-citizen servicemembers. The Army has already 
engaged in a limited initiative to recruit 1,000 individuals nationwide in 
order to test the feasibility of a subsequent increase in the number of such 
recruits and an expansion to all other branches of the military with the end 
goal being upwards of 14,000 non-citizen recruits—the equivalent of one in 
six recruits—per year.166 The truth is that as the U.S. has fought two wars on 
two fronts, “recruiters [have] struggled to meet their goals for the all-
volunteer military” while at the same time recruiting officers have been 
turning away “thousands of legal immigrants with temporary visas who 
tried to enlist” simply because they did not have the required “permanent 
green cards.”167
The proposed U.S. Foreign Legion builds on suggestions from the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting168 and is generally in keeping with 
statements made by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl 
Levin that the U.S. transition away from heavy reliance on contractors and 
use them as needed, and only where properly vetted, in the meantime.169
 162. ANITA U. HATTIANGADI ET AL., CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS, NON-CITIZENS IN 
TODAY’S MILITARY: FINAL REPORT 6 (2005). 
 163. Id. at 6-7; see also Julia Preston, U.S. Military Will Offer Path to Citizenship,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/us/15immig.html 
(approximating the number of foreign-born non-citizen military personnel at 29,000). 
 164. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 7. 
 165. Id. at 6; see also Preston, supra note 163. 
 166. Preston, supra note 163. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See discussion supra Part II (analyzing overreliance on PMC personnel). 
 169. Levin Press Conference, supra note 22. 
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Senator Levin suggests that the U.S. move some of the current PMC 
personnel into the Afghan army/security force with proper vetting.170 This 
note does not oppose handing off as much responsibility to the Afghan 
security force as is feasible. However, this note does recognize that a 
complete transition is not likely going to be immediate and suggests the 
U.S. Foreign Legion be implemented to address the continued need for U.S. 
presence. 
2. Support in Existing Domestic Laws 
U.S. law already provides options for non-citizens who wish to serve. 
However, under previous immigration laws, an individual typically had to 
obtain permanent residency before being able to serve in the U.S. armed 
forces.171 Now, that requirement has been reduced such that temporary 
immigrants who have lived here for 2 years or more can enlist.172 Moreover, 
“[u]nder a statute invoked in 2002 by the Bush administration, immigrants 
who serve in the military can [start the application process] to become 
citizens on the first day of active service, and they can take the oath in as 
little as six months.”173 As this quote from the New York Times indicates, 
Executive Order 13269174 made it substantially easier for non-citizens to 
serve in the U.S. military and rewarded those who served with expedited 
citizenship. Generally, the benefits that are described in Executive Order 
13269 were reserved for those individuals who had served honorably or are 
enlisted to serve in the U.S. military for at least 12 years.175 Executive Order 
13269 of July 3, 2002176 significantly expedited citizenship options codified 
in section 329 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).177
Executive Order 13269 of 2002 was not the end of these types of 
changes. The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act 
[r]educed the peacetime waiting period for U.S. citizenship application[s,] 
[a]llowed applicants to be granted emergency leave and priority 
government transportation to complete citizenship processing[,] 
[e]liminated all application fees for non-citizen servicemembers[,] 
 170. Id. 
 171. 10 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006) (describing who may legally enlist in the U.S. armed 
forces); see also HATTENGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 10 tbl.1, 27. 
 172. Preston, supra note 163. 
 173. Id.
 174. Exec. Order No. 13,269, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,287 (July 8, 2008), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002_register&docid=02-
17273-filed.pdf. 
 175. 8 C.F.R § 245.8(a) (“Benefits under this section are limited to aliens who have 
served honorably (or are enlisted to serve) in the Armed Forces of the United States for at 
least 12 years . . . .”). 
 176. Executive Order 13,269, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,287. 
 177. Immigration and Nationality Act § 329, 8 U.S.C. § 1440 (2006). 
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[a]llowed for the finalization of military citizenship applications to take 
place at U.S. consulates, embassies, and overseas U.S. military 
installations[, and] [g]ave special immigration preference to the immediate 
family of non-citizens awarded posthumous citizenship.178
Thus, the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act seems to suggest a 
willingness to move in the direction that is proposed in this note.  
The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act specifically addressed the 
immigration benefits for military personnel and their families described 
above by amending portions of the INA.179 Specifically, section 1701 of the 
2004 National Defense Authorization Act addressed naturalization 
requirements for non-citizen servicemembers and reduced the period of 
service that was required before an individual could apply for citizenship 
under section 328(a) of the INA180 from 3 years to 1 year,181 essentially 
codifying what President Bush had done via Executive Order 13269 in 
2002.182 Section 1701 further amended the INA to provide that “no fee shall 
be charged or collected from the applicant for filing the application, or for 
the issuance of a certificate of naturalization upon being granted citizenship 
. . .”
183
 Section 1702 provided naturalization benefits for members of the 
Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve.184 Section 1703 also extended 
posthumous benefits to surviving spouses, children, and parents of non-
citizen service-members while section 1704 expedited the process for 
grating citizenship posthumously to those non-citizen servicemembers who 
gave the ultimate sacrifice in service to the United States.185 The enabling 
legislation for the U.S. Foreign Legion should build on this existing legal 
framework. 
As discussed above in Part II.F, Congress has already attempted to 
impose more traditional military accountability on contractor personnel with 
little success.186 By bringing PMC personnel serving in such operations 
more directly under existing military authority, the proposed U.S. Foreign 
 178. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 1- 2. 
 179. National Defense Authorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-136, 117 Stat. 1392 
(2003).  
 180. National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 § 1701, 8 U.S.C. 1439(a) (2006) 
(amended 2008). 
 181. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 1-2. (providing an overview of the 
changes to section 328 of the INA that were made by the National Defense Authorization 
Act of 2004). 
 182. National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 § 1701; see also Bush Speeds 
Citizenship for Military, CNN (July 3, 2002), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/07/03/bush.military.citizenship/index.html?related. 
 183. Immigration and Nationality Act § 328(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1439 (2006). 
 184. National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 § 1702. 
 185. Id. §§ 1703-1704.  
 186. See discussion supra Part II.F. 
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Legion would be in keeping with the intent behind the 2007 UCMJ 
amendments.187
E. Implementing the U.S. Foreign Legion 
As described above, one major hurdle to implementation of the proposed 
U.S. Foreign Legion would be the enactment of legislation required to 
create the Legion. Additional issues related to implementation would 
include how to organize the Legion, what type of functions the Legion 
would be responsible for, and the type of training that would be required. 
1. Organizing 
In terms of logistics, the first issue might be whether to create a wholly 
separate military branch or to place the U.S. Foreign Legion under one of 
the existing U.S. military branches. Based on a successful pilot program in 
the U.S. Army for non-citizen soldiers,188 as well as the fact that the U.S. 
Navy has the greatest number of non-citizen active duty members of any 
branch,189 this note suggests initially placing the proposed U.S. Foreign 
Legion under one of these two branches. 
One of the next major logistical concerns would be how many troops 
divided into how many divisions. One anonymous U.S. Army Captain 
posted his suggestion to a forum on a military community website in 2004, 
suggesting that a U.S. Foreign Legion should consist of three 8,000 member 
infantry divisions for a total of 24,000 active duty members.190
2. Recruiting 
This note suggests incorporating current PMC personnel into the new 
U.S. Foreign Legion to the extent possible. Based on the current numbers of 
PMC personnel,191 a force of 24,000 seems relatively conservative. 
Assuming an eventual drawdown in U.S. presence in Afghanistan, a force 
numbering somewhere between the anonymously suggested 24,000 and the 
more than 150,000 non-citizen PMC personnel currently serving in Iraq and 
Afghanistan192 provides a very crude range for the number of U.S. Foreign 
 187. Singer, supra note 70. 
 188. Preston, supra note 163.
 189. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 7. 
 190. Wayne Hommer, Guest Column, An American Foreign Legion, MILITARY.COM
(Jan. 21, 2004), http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Defensewatch_012104_Forei 
gn,00.html (reposting an article from DefenseWatch, a publication put out by Soldiers for the 
Truth). 
 191. See discussion supra Part II.A (estimating the number of PMC personnel serving 
in theater at around 200,000 with around 150,000 being foreign nationals). 
 192. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 7 (citations omitted). 
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Legionnaires that may be needed. Since approximately 26,000 PMC 
personnel are currently devoted to security operations in Afghanistan,193 a 
force near this size may likely be suitable for a more narrowly tailored 
solution. 
Given the large numbers of PMC personnel already in theater who could 
potentially be absorbed into an American Foreign and the fact that around 
8,000 new non-citizen recruits already join existing U.S. military branches 
each year,194 it is likely that the U.S. would be able to sustain a sufficiently 
large troop force without much difficulty. Additionally, there are nearly 1.5 
million Legal Permanent Residents of recruitable age (18 to 24) living right 
here in the U.S.195 who may be interested in the benefits that military service 
in such a unit would offer.  
However, if active recruiting is required, the U.S. could look to the 
French Foreign Legion or the Gurkha Brigades for guidance in recruiting 
foreign citizens or absorbing those already in theater. After all, these 
fighting forces have certainly managed to create sufficient draw to keep 
their forces fully staffed, with the French Foreign Legion accepting only 1 
in 8 applicants196 and the Brigade of Gurkhas accepting only 230 of roughly 
28,000 applicants annually.197
3. Training 
This note suggests that the proposed U.S. Foreign Legion be designed to 
address the current security functions now being handled by PMC 
personnel. This note does not suggest that the U.S. create a new military 
force comprised entirely of foreign nationals who are trained for purely 
combat missions. Instead, U.S. Foreign Legion troops should be trained for 
the modern security functions that our military has been forced to outsource. 
Even the French Foreign Legion has had to retool for the twenty-first 
century to focus on peacekeeping operations.198 This is not to suggest that 
U.S. Foreign Legionnaires would not need to be well trained but that such 
training should focus on the needs at hand—the needs currently filled by 
PMC personnel. Training for U.S. Foreign Legionnaires should thereby 
focus on providing security for military installations (bases, airfields, etc.), 
diplomats and politicians, and reconstruction projects. 
Effective communication on the battlefield would be essential to the 
success of a U.S. Foreign Legion. Just as the French Foreign Legion 
 193. Levin Press Conference, supra note 22. 
 194. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162; see also Preston, supra note 163, at 1. 
 195. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 6, 11. 
 196. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 21- 22 (quoting a Major in the French Foreign 
Legion who explains that the large number of would-be legionnaires means that the Legion 
has the ability to be selective in who it accepts). 
 197. GURKHAS: TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 147, at 7. 
 198. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 254 (2010). 
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requires all recruits be functionally proficient in French, all U.S. Foreign 
Legionnaires would need to have a common language. Currently, the U.S. 
military requires that all new recruits have a basic level of English 
proficiency,199 and the proposed U.S. Foreign Legion would be no 
exception. A recent Army test program to recruit certain non-citizens with 
temporary visas did not change this requirement. “[Recruits] will have to 
pass an English test.”200
The same anonymous U.S. Army Captain who posted on Military.com 
regarding troop divisions suggested an intensive six-week English language 
course to ensure effective communication skills in the field.201 All other 
aspects of training should be used to help recruits learn via immersion, as it 
is in large part with the French Foreign Legion.202 Formalized classroom 
training may also be needed. One unique method, embraced by the French 
Foreign Legion, is to assign each new recruit a native French speaker to 
assist the recruit in language acquisition.203 Here, each new recruit could be 
assigned a native English speaker. 
Such language instruction should focus on enabling effective 
communication while still embracing the multilingual abilities that would 
come with a military force comprised of members from around the globe. 
As Lt. Gen. Benjamin C. Freakley suggested when speaking about the U.S. 
Army test program, the inclusion of foreign nationals would offer an 
increase in human capital.204
The French Foreign Legion actually points to the multilingual 
capabilities of its members as an inherent advantage of having such a 
diverse military force.205 Apparently, the French Foreign Legion has even 
been called in for translation efforts in recent peacekeeping efforts in 
Rwanda.206 In the far-reaching war on terror, “linguistic and cultural 
diversity non-citizens bring to the services are especially valuable.”207
In addition to the language training, U.S. Foreign Legionnaires would 
still face the same strict training conditions that meet U.S. recruits at bases 
all over the U.S. 
 199. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 93-94 (discussing Army and Navy basic 
English language requirements). 
 200. Preston, supra note 163. 
 201. Hommer, supra note 190. 
 202. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 41. 
 203. Id.
 204. Preston, supra note 163. 
 205. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 254. 
 206. Id. 
 207. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 7. 
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4. Equipping 
In terms of equipment, U.S. Foreign Legionnaires should be armed based 
upon the task they are assigned and should be given the best equipment to 
accomplish their tasks. This means that instead of scavenging for 
substandard weapons and ammunition in the black markets of a host nation 
like some PMC personnel have had to do,208 or riding around in improperly 
armored vehicles,209 the U.S. Foreign Legion would have the same standard 
issue firearms and armor as U.S. troops. 
F. Possible Criticism 
1. Resistance to Change from Within Military 
Some in the military may object to an influx of non-citizen soldiers. The 
logical response to that would be “look around you.” With more than half of 
the U.S. presence in Afghanistan consisting of non-citizen—and, in fact, 
non-military—personnel, and with 8,000 non-citizens joining existing U.S. 
military branches annually,210 this objection seems ignorant of the realities 
of the situation. 
2. Xenophobia 
The purpose of this paper is not to suggest that the U.S. wholly shove 
responsibility for fighting and dying off on non-citizen foreign nationals; 
the conflict in Afghanistan is our own. This note simply proposes 
legitimizing the current de facto situation. 
In looking to historical examples of non-citizen military units, this note 
does not ignore the fact that economic pressures have been major 
motivating factors.211 Some who have studied the potential inclusion of non-
citizens in the U.S. military have noted that the age and economic status of 
large portions of the world’s population mean a large potential pool of 
recruits. 
About a third of the world’s population is under age 15, and the 
overwhelming majority lives in developing countries. Because this large 
bulge of future workers will have difficulty finding work in their native 
countries, many may emigrate—either alone or with young families. Of the 
 208. See SHADOW COMPANY, supra note 122 (describing the black market as a 
workaround for PMC personnel where the permitting process and cost to import needed 
weaponry is prohibitive). 
 209. See, e.g., id.
 210. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 1; see also Preston, supra note 163. 
 211. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 16. 
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16 million foreign-born people who entered the United States between 1990 
and 2002, almost a quarter were under age 21.212
However, there are other reasons why individuals have joined units like 
the French Foreign Legion and might therefore be interested in joining the 
proposed U.S. Foreign Legion.213 Indeed, if the French Foreign Legion is 
any example, more equitable benefits for Legionnaires and the promise of 
citizenship would make service to the U.S. Foreign Legion even more 
appealing to a wider range of individuals.214
3. Duplication or Segregation of Current Forces 
This note suggests the creation of a new military force that would bring 
into the folds of the American military those positions currently handled by 
non-citizen foreign nationals. This note does not suggest placing all non-
citizens in only the proposed U.S. Foreign Legion; it does not suggest 
taking those servicemembers who are currently serving in the Marine Corps, 
Army, Navy, or Air Force and segregating them into the proposed U.S. 
Foreign Legion.215 This new military force would represent another option 
for non-citizens interested in serving on behalf of the U.S. 
4. Afghan Nationals May Not Wish to Become U.S. Citizens 
Many of the non-citizen PMC personnel working for U.S. interests in 
Afghanistan are Afghan nationals.216 These individuals may not wish to take 
advantage of the potential to become U.S. citizens through service in the 
U.S. Foreign Legion. However, the U.S. Foreign Legion would not be 
trying to capitalize on all 200,000 PMC personnel and so, assuming many 
Afghan nationals currently working for PMC’s opt out of becoming U.S. 
Foreign Legionnaires, this would mean only a reduced pool of applicants. 
Additionally, extending the offer of U.S. citizenship would give those who 
were interested a chance to gain U.S. citizenship for their service should 
they choose to pursue it. Lastly, the more equitable pay scale, better 
organizational structure, and increased accountability may be preferred even 
among those PMC personnel who are not interested in the citizenship aspect 
of the U.S. Foreign Legion. 
 212. HATTIANGADI ET AL., supra note 162, at 5. 
 213. GILBERT, supra note 108, at 17 -18 (describing those who may desire to enter a 
military force like the French Foreign Legion for purely professional reasons—to be a 
professional soldier—and those who seek refuge from any number of political pressures in 
their native countries). 
 214. See id. at 18. 
 215. See discussion supra Part III.D.i. 
 216. CWC, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 2, at 7 (citations omitted). 
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5. End of Hostilities in Afghanistan 
Assuming an eventual conclusion of U.S. involvement in hostilities in 
Afghanistan and given the fact that many of the PMC personnel are highly 
trained, it would be logical to retain some portion of this force for security 
in other areas. An end to hostilities in Afghanistan would not necessarily 
mean a dismantling of the U.S. Foreign Legion. Looking to the French 
Foreign Legion as an example, one of the major adjustments following the 
independence of Algeria included the reduction of the Legion from 20,000 
troops to 8,000 troops.217 Currently, the United Kingdom is slated to reduce 
its elite Gurkha regiment by 700 servicemembers to a troop size of 2,900 
soldiers by 2015.218 Yet, despite troop reductions or changes in mission 
objectives, both of these military units endure and a U.S. Foreign Legion 
could likewise adapt to changing demands. 
Additionally, this criticism presupposes an end to hostilities that would 
require an augmented U.S. fighting force like the proposed U.S. Foreign 
Legion. Recent events in Syria219 and rhetoric among some in Congress220
may foreshadow the need for such a force in future conflicts. 
CONCLUSION
While undoubtedly producing new challenges, the creation of a formal 
U.S. Foreign Legion would address many of the issues caused by the 
current overreliance on PMC personnel for mission-critical functions 
described above. Such a military unit would place the use of military-style 
force squarely back within the proper control of the sovereign U.S. 
government221 and would appropriately recognize the efforts of those 
 217. JORDAN, supra note 131, at 92- 93. 
 218. UK to Reduce Gurkha Brigade Size, EKANTIPUR.COM (Apr. 4, 2011), 
http://www.ekantipur.com/2011/04/04/top-story/uk-to-reduce-gurkha-brigade-
size/331977.html. 
 219. See, e.g., Anne Barnard, Syria Opposition Group Is Routed and Divided, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/world/middle 
east/syria-torture-report-military-maintains-assaults.html?ref=global-home; Michel Martin, 
Is There A Moral Duty To Intervene In Syria? (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 15, 2012), 
available at http://www.npr.org/2012/03/15/148678004/is-there-a-moral-duty-to-intervene-
in-syria (discussing possible intervention in Syria with professor Shaun Casey, who teaches 
“Just War” theory, and Abderrahim Foukara of Al Jazeera International). 
 220. See, e.g., Sen. John McCain, Syrians Need the U.S. to Act Now, USA TODAY,
(Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/story/2012-03-14/Syria-
John-McCain-Assad/53536942/1. 
 221. Discussions of military intervention center on the rights and responsibilities of 
sovereign states, not those of private, for-profit companies. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, 
para. 4, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml (addressing 
limits of states with respect to the use of force); U.N. Charter art. 51, available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml (addressing the right of member 
states to defend themselves); Letter dated Oct. 7, 2001 from John D. Negroponte, Permanent 
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individuals who are currently serving U.S. interests without commensurate 
benefits. Lastly, such a force would enhance U.S. security interests 
abroad—through increases in oversight and control of PMC personnel—and 
would help reign in fraud and waste at a time when the U.S. government 
can afford neither. 
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